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The Porter hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental stan-
dards may be oﬀset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis
using a game of timing of technology adoption. We will show that times of adoption
will be earlier if the non-adoption tax is higher. The environmental tax will turn the
preemption game with low proﬁts into a game with credible precommitment generating
higher proﬁts (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental
taxes, the introduction of a tax will lead to lower proﬁts (anti-Porter). An evaluation
of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis will hold even for proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competition,
X-ineﬃciency, and agency costs. These aremore likely to be present in sectors with large
ﬁrms. In many case studies that we have evaluated, though, we detected an element of
explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line
with Pigovian policies.
Keywords: environmental policy; strategic trade theory; technology adoption; Porter
hypothesis
JEL: Q2, F1, H7, O3
1. Introduction
Competition among ﬁrms insures eﬃciency in competitive markets. Environmental regula-
tion or taxation is usually seen as a nuisance to international competition, which will lead to
a distortion of competition. On the other hand, many markets are imperfectly competitive.
Firms can have market power or dynamic innovation eﬀects will disturb the eﬃcient pro-
duction of goods. In combining the environmental regulationwith the innovation eﬀects and
dynamic adoption or development of new production methods, the environmental Porter
hypothesis suggests that the costs of compliancewith environmental standardsmay be oﬀset
by the innovations they trigger (see Porter 1991; Porter and van der Linde 1995a, 1995b).
This may even lead to absolute advantages relative to foreign competitors. In their article
(1995a) (abbreviated as PL henceforth) they state:
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[W]e will argue that properly designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that
may partially or more than fully oﬀset the costs of complying with them. Such ‘innovation
oﬀsets,’ as we call them, can not only lower the net cost of meeting environmental regulations,
but can even lead to absolute advantages over ﬁrms in foreign countries not subject to similar
regulations. Innovation oﬀsets will be common because reducing pollution is often coincident
with improving the productivity with which resources are used. In short, ﬁrms can actually
beneﬁt from properly crafted environmental regulations that are more stringent (or are imposed
earlier) than those faced by their competitors in other countries. By stimulating innovation,
strict environmental regulations can actually enhance competitiveness. (1995a, 98)
The article was greeted with scepticism, as conventional models predict ecological
dumping as an outcome rather than increased environmental regulation to improve com-
petitiveness. Nevertheless, it made economists think seriously about the gist of the Porter
hypothesis: is it possible that ﬁrms could gain advantage over their foreign rivals through
tougher environmental regulation? While classical trade theory oﬀers no reason to believe
in the Porter hypothesis, imperfect competition models were considered promising to ﬁnd
some theoretical foundations for the case study and anecdotal evidence oﬀered by PL.
The contribution of this paper lies in our approach to model the Porter hypothesis as
well as an interpretation of the empirical literature. We will argue that it is inherent to
the Porter hypothesis to explicitly model the timing choice of both the home and foreign
ﬁrm’s technology adoption. It is the timing of adoption of new technology combined with
international diﬀerences in the regulation that are at the core of the Porter hypothesis as
it was originally formulated. The endogenous timing of the adoption aspect of the Porter
hypothesis resulting in a competitive position of being a leader or follower has not been
captured in formal theory so far, although in the literature there are other dynamic models
discussed below. In this paper, we adapt the model of technology adoption of Reinganum
(1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, 1987) for this purpose. The model allows for
endogenous timing of technology adoption in a model of imperfect competition.
A point we want to make is that environmental policy may destroy a non-adoption
equilibrium. It may be rational not to adopt, although no opportunities are overlooked. In a
static game of technology adoption (Tirole 1988, Chapter 10) with environmental taxation,
it can be shown that a suﬃciently high environmental tax can force ﬁrms out of a non-
adoption equilibrium. However, this falls short of the Porter hypothesis, which implies
a ‘competitive’ advantage for the nation that introduces the environmental regulation. In
the static environment, the increased competitiveness cannot be reached. If one country
introduces environmental regulation that forces the ‘home’ ﬁrm out of a static non-adoption
equilibrium, the other ﬁrm would follow immediately.
In Section 2, we introduce a dynamic model of a game of timing with a case of small
environmental taxes turning a preemption game into one of precommitment. We therefore
extend this to the international case, providing a model of the Porter hypothesis. We can
show that the introduction of a small environmental tax can turn the dynamic game of timing
from a preemption game towards one of pre-commitment in which the regulated ﬁrm is sure
to have the technological lead. Thus, the Porter hypothesis can be endorsed in the sense
that the introduction of a small tax ensures that the home ﬁrm would win a preemption
game with certainty. This establishes an order of adoption and therefore a precommitment
situation which produces higher proﬁts for home than in the preemption game, which would
have taken place without the tax. In Section 3, we consider issues of optimal timing.
We do not follow PL in emphasizing incomplete information, organizational inertia,
and control problems in the theoretical part of our paper. Rather, we emphasize that all of
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their examples contain clear elements of implicit subsidies for adoption, which are equiv-
alent to taxes on non-adoption in our model. We do not deny the role of the imperfections,
but the logic is also compelling without them. In an evaluation of the empirical and the-
oretical literature in Section 4, we will show that both types of arguments seem to be
relevant: (i) X-ineﬃciency and agency costs such as managerial time, alertness, and infor-
mation, and (ii) strategic interactions in imperfectly competitive markets. Both are likely
to be more relevant for large ﬁrms. The theoretical models trying to rationalize the Porter
hypothesis clearly show that in their interpretation, the Porter hypothesis does not contra-
dict the proﬁt-maximization paradigm under multiple market imperfections (Ambec and
Barla 2005).
1.1. Earlier literature
Ulph (1996a,b) constructs a Brander–Spencer type of strategic trade model with Cournot
competition. Firms can invest in technology-aﬀecting variable costs but not the accom-
panying pollution. He shows that the strategic interaction between producers reduces the
government’s incentive to loosen environmental regulation. He concludes, though, that the
reduction of pollution with the lowering of the variable costs could change that result. This
is the path that Simpson and Bradford III (1996) pick up. They model the ﬁrms in a similar
fashion, with the exception that R&D not only lowers marginal costs, but also the emission
of the pollutant. The government uses eﬄuent taxation to maximize the domestic ﬁrm’s
proﬁts net of the environmental externalities of production. The government is able to force
the ﬁrm into a Stackelberg-leader position relative to its foreign competitor. For some spe-
cial cases of speciﬁcations and numerical parameter values, they are able to construct a
strengthening of regulation, resulting in a shift of proﬁts from foreign to domestic ﬁrms.
However, they emphasize that this is not a general result and it is unlikely that environmental
regulation should be used as a policy device to induce industrial advantage. Greaker (2003)
models the Porter hypothesis by assuming that due to the abatement technology the envi-
ronment is an inferior input in the production process. For some ranges of environmental
taxation, it is shown to increase competitiveness. However, the impact on proﬁts remains
ambiguous. Feess and Taistra (2000) model a two-period game with Cournot competition.
The environmentally friendly technology is assumed to lead to a decrease of unit costs in
the second period, however, not in a way that reduces overall costs. Policy agencies of the
foreign nation are assumed to stochastically imitate the national environmental regulation.
Bertrand-type imperfect competition models were introduced in the context of strategic
environmental trade policy in the paper by Barrett (1994). In the context of cost-saving
research, Ulph (1996) shows both for environmental taxation and for environmental stan-
dards that ﬁrms can beneﬁt from tighter regulation if only the governments act strategically,
but ﬁrms do not.
Principal-agent models of the Porter hypothesis are set in the context of organizational
ineﬃciencies. In this model, the incentives between principal and agent over the choice of
projects are misaligned. Environmental regulation helps to realign the preferences of princi-
pal and agent, hence the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm increases (see, for example, Schmutzler (2001)
and Klein and Rothfels (1999)). Ambec and Barla (2002) show that, by reducing agency
costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation while at the
same time increasing ﬁrms’ private beneﬁt.
Popp (2005) shows that under uncertain R&D, when ﬁrms underestimate the proﬁtabil-
ity, environmental regulation may push them to do more proﬁtable R&D. His simulations
show that complete oﬀsets occur frequently, though not in a majority of cases.
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Xepapadeas and deZeeuw (1999) andMohr (2002) use a general equilibrium framework
with a large number of agents, external economies of scale in production, and discrete
changes in technology. New technologies are modelled with an industry learning curve, and
ﬁrms are initially stuck in a non-innovating equilibrium. Environmental regulation enforces
the adoption of ‘new technology’, hence allowing for subsequent learning. Feichtinger
et al. (2005) extend on the framework of Xepapadeas and Zeeuw (1999) by introducing
technological progress within the capital stock of ﬁrms. The dynamic determination of the
optimal age of the capital stock, representing the degree of capital adoption, is then related
to the level of environmental regulation.
Related to our paper is Hübner (2002). Using a duopoly model of patent races, which are
similar to our models of technology adoption, she shows that stricter environmental policy
might increase the probability of a sleeping patent instead of encouraging environmental
technological progress, but the reversed case is also possible: environmental policy may
activate otherwise sleeping patents.
Also, the paper of Osang and Nandy (2003) shows that in a symmetric Cournot duo-
ploy model with pollution, ﬁrms can stick to high-pollution production processes, or to
low-pollution production processes, depending on the government regulation. Thus, for a
technology adoption process, they show the adoption of new production processes as a
reaction to competitive pressures combined with government regulation.
Empirical support for the hypothesis is based on case study evidence, which will be
reviewed in the next subsection. There are, however, two general empirical attempts to test
parts of PL: Palmer, Oates, and Portney (1995) provide empirical arguments explaining
why full oﬀsets are rather unlikely. They base their argument on information provided by
entrepreneurs and ﬁnd no direct evidence for the Porter hypothesis. Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997)
critically evaluate the Porter hypothesis. They attempt to empirically ‘test’ the hypothesis,
but ﬁnd no evidence supporting it. This empirical evaluation is based on the link between
the stringency of environmental regulation and R&D, but not on adoption.
2. Environmental taxes in a game of timing
In static models of technology adoption, ﬁrms either both adopt or not at all even if only
one country raises a tax. Intermediate cases are not possible in this setting. However, Rein-
ganum (1981) and the extension by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) provide such a model
where ﬁrms either adopt earlier or later. We apply the model to the case of environmental
regulation in the spirit of the Porter hypothesis. This allows us to theoretically evaluate the
hypothesis, as we allow for dynamic eﬀects which are crucial in the argumentation leading
towards an increased competitiveness.
Here we restate their model for the case of two ﬁrms and introduce an environmental
non-adoption tax, τ .1 We show that all possible modes of adoption – preemption, following,
and joint late adoption – are earlier, the higher the adoption tax.Moreover, an environmental
tax ensures a precommitment position for the domestic ﬁrm. But it decreases proﬁts when
increased further. A low environmental tax ensures a preemptive position of the domes-
tic ﬁrm, establishes an order of adoption, and therefore leads also to a precommitment
associated with higher proﬁt for the home ﬁrm.
Let π0(0) − τ denote after-tax proﬁts of a ﬁrm if no ﬁrm has yet adopted. π0(1) − τ
denotes after-tax proﬁts of a ﬁrm if only the other ﬁrm has adopted. π1(1) is the proﬁt of a
ﬁrm which has adopted but the other ﬁrm has not. π1(2) is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm if both have
adopted.2
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There is a cost c(t) associated with adoption. Early adoption of new technology is more
costly, hence c is a function of time such that early adoption is more costly (c′ < 0).3 Using
superscript 2 for the ﬁrm that is second to adopt, the follower, and superscript 1 for the
leader, the value of the ﬁrms with adoption times T1 and T2 can be written as follows:4
V 1(T1,T2) =
∫ T1
0
[π0(0) − τ ]e−rt dt +
∫ T2
T1
π1(1)e−rt dt +
∫ ∞
T2
[π1(2)]e−rt dt − c(T1),
(1)
V 2(T2,T1)=
∫ T1
0
[π0(0) − τ ]e−rt dt +
∫ T2
T1
[π0(1) − τ ]e−rt dt +
∫ ∞
T2
π1(2)e−rt dt −c(T2).
(2)
Firms diﬀer only in two aspects. First, in the second phase, between T1 and T2, ﬁrm 1
has adopted and ﬁrm 2 has not. Second, the present values of the cost of adoption, c, at
diﬀerent points in time are diﬀerent, as c(T2) < c(T1) given assumption 4 below.
Assumptions made on the magnitude of the proﬁt and cost items are the following:
(1) There are decreasing returns in the rank of adoption: π1(1) > π1(2).
(2) The diﬀerence in proﬁts from adoption, at time zero, is not larger than the decrease
in the costs of adopting while waiting: π1(1) − [π0(1) − τ ] ≤ −c′(0) for all τ ≥
0. Therefore, immediate adoption is not proﬁtable unless the equality part of the
equation holds.
(3) Second adoption always becomes proﬁtable after some time: inf t{c(t)ert} <
{π1(2) − [π0(1) − τ ]}/r for all τ ≥ 0.
(4) Current costs of adoption are falling but decreasingly so: for all t, (c(t)ert)′ < 0,
(c(t)ert)′′ > 0.
The decreasing returns in the rank of adoption assumption (1) implies that adoption is
more proﬁtable, if one is the only producer that has adoption.
No general claim is made here or by PL that early adoption or ﬁrst moving is advan-
tageous in general (see Hoppe (2002) for a survey of theory and evidence), but the case
studies which support the Porter hypothesis are those of advantageous early adoption. The
ideas of PL (1995b, 124–9) are clearly based on the assumption of a ﬁrst mover advantage.
Notice though that π captures proﬁts gross of adoption costs, whereas early adoption and
ﬁrst mover advantage are derived on the basis of both gross proﬁts and adoption costs, c,
considered below. Other outcomes are shown to be possible as well.
The second assumptionmerely excludes cases of immediate adoption. The third assump-
tion insures that the new technology is superior to the old one in the sense that it can generate
more proﬁts once the costs of adoption have decreased suﬃciently.5 Immediate adoption is
not relevant here, because under immediate adoption there would be no room for regulations
to speed up innovation (oﬀsets), which are typical of the Porter hypothesis.
Finally, the last assumption gives a shape to the cost of adoption function. The decreasing
costs of adoption is straightforward.
The assumptions on the order of the proﬁt terms asmade are essential to having a sequen-
tial adoption problem. They are satisﬁed in a linear Cournot model (Tirole 1988; Hoppe
2002). Deriving them jointly with other possible outcomes would increase the complexity
substantially.
It is obvious from assumptions (2) and (3) that taxes on non-adoption are equivalent
to subsidies for adoption. There are many examples for this type of taxes or subsidies
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summarized in Table 4. The examples serve two purposes: they show that there is a lot of
emphasis on adoption in PL, leading to innovation oﬀsets, and there are often implicit or
explicit taxes or subsidies involved.
2.1. Games of timing: national case
In the national case, both ﬁrms are regulated by the same national policy, hence they both
operate under non-adoption tax. We will develop the optimal timing of adoption in the case
of a national competition ﬁrst, i.e. where both ﬁrms are faced with the same environmental
regulation and taxation. In Section 2.2, this will be changed to the international case in
which only the home ﬁrm faces an environmental non-adoption tax. The derivations of the
optimal timings of this section can be applied to the international case by setting the foreign
ﬁrm’s tax equal to zero.
Precommitment allows a ﬁrm to commit to being either follower or leader. However,
in order for precommitment to matter, it has to be credible. We will argue below that the
environmental tax will eventually allow the ﬁrm to credibly precommit.6
Given credible precommitment on the order of adoption, the optimal adoption time for
the leader, T1, can be found from the ﬁrst-order condition
dV 1
dT1
= [π0(0) − τ ]e−rT1 − π1(1)e−rT1 − c′(T1) = 0. (3)
The optimal adoption time for the follower in case of a precommitment can similarly be
found from the ﬁrst-order condition
dV 2
dT2
= [π0(1) − τ ]e−rT2 − π1(2)e−rT2 − c′(T2) = 0. (4)
If the leader has already adopted, the last equation determines the followers optimal
time, T ∗2 . Note that the equations determine the optimal timing for the follower irrespective
of the existence or absence of precommitment. Thus, it allows us to calculate the impact
of the environmental tax on the followers’ optimal adoption time, by diﬀerentiating with
respect to the level of environmental taxation τ :
dT ∗2
dτ
= − −e
−rT2
[π0(1) − τ ](−r)e−rT2 + rπ1(2)e−rT2 − c′′(T2) = −
−e−rT2
−rc′(T2) − c′′(T2) < 0.
(5)
The second part of the equation has been obtained by insertion of c′ from Equation (4).
Assumption (4) implies that the denominator, which is also the second-order condition of
Equation (4), has a negative sign.
The dependence of timing of the leader upon the environmental tax can be derived in a
similar fashion:
dT ∗1
dτ
= − −e
−rT1
[π0(0) − τ ](−r)e−rT1 + rπ1(1)e−rT1 − c′′(T1) = −
−e−rT1
−rc′(T1) − c′′(T1) < 0.
(6)
This leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 The leader and the follower adopt earlier under precommitment if the
environmental tax is larger.
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This proposition, while not surprising, is important in the sense that the tax aﬀects both
the leader and the follower by shortening the adoption time. Especially, the eﬀect on the
follower is often overlooked, while it leads to important changes: the leader will have lower
overall gains from leading if the follower adopts earlier.While from the environmental point
of view, the eﬀect of regulation is improved (quickened) adoption of themore environmental
friendly technology by both types of ﬁrms.
Note that the previous results were derived under the assumption that there is one
obvious leader and an obvious follower. This could be achieved by credible precommitment.
If, however, there is no precommitment on the order of adoption, preemption might be a
rational choice for ﬁrms. The timing of preemption can be found as follows. The leader’s
payoﬀ if she succeeds in preempting at time t is
L(t) =
{
V (t,T ∗2 ) if t < T ∗2 ,
V (t, t) if t ≥ T ∗2 ,
(7)
where V (x, y) is the value of adopting at time t = x, given adoption by the other ﬁrm at
t = y. The followers payoﬀ if he is preempted at time t is
F(t) =
{
V (T ∗2 , t) if t < T ∗2 ,
V (t, t) if t ≥ T ∗2 .
(8)
If both ﬁrms adopt simultaneously, the payoﬀ for each ﬁrm is M (T ) = V (t, t).
If t < T ∗2 , L(t) > M (t) and F(t) > M (t).
The important issue here is to ﬁgure out how the timing of precommitment and following
are aﬀected by environmental taxes. There are several issues here. First, what is the optimal
moment of adoption, given that a ﬁrm wants to preempt (and similarly given that one wants
to follow), and secondly, what is the diﬀerence between leader and follower payoﬀ. Thus,
subtracting the payoﬀ of a follower from that of a leader, and plugging in Equations (3)
and (4), oneﬁnds that the ﬁrst- and second-order conditions ofmaximizing this diﬀerence are
[L(t) − F(t)]′ = −π1(1)e−rT1 − c′(T1) + [π0(1) − τ ]e−rT1 = 0, (9)
[L(t) − F(t)]′′ = −rc′ − c′′ < 0, (10)
because of assumption (4). As L(t) − F(t) has a maximum, each ﬁrm would like to pre-
empt the other. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), L(0) < F(0) from assumption (2) and
L(T ∗2 ) = F(T ∗2 ) from the deﬁnitions of L and F , and L(T ∗1 ) > F(T ∗1 ) from V 1(T ∗1 ,T ∗2 ) >
V 2(T ∗2 ,T ∗1 ) under precommitment. Together with the monotonicity of the value functions,
this information implies that there must be a point in time, T1, at which L(T1) = F(T1) (cf.
Fudenberg and Tirole 1985, 386). This is the ﬁrst proﬁtable point in time for preemption.
Problematic in the model with preemption is that, given symmetric ﬁrms, both would like
to preempt at the same time or not at all.
Equating the values of the ﬁrms, V 1,2, for this point in time yields
L(T1) − F(T1) =
∫ T2
T1
π1(1)e−rtdt − c(T1) −
{∫ T2
T1
[π0(1) − τ ]e−rtdt − c(T2)
}
= 0
(11)
Proposition 2.2 Under preemption, the timing of preemptive adoption will be earlier if
the environmental tax is higher.
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This follows fromEquation (11), which, diﬀerentiatedwith respect to the environmental
tax, implies
dT1
dτ
= −
∫ T2
T1
e−rt dt
−π1(1)e−rT1 + [π0(1) − τ ]e−rT1 − c′(T1) < 0. (12)
Hence, the timing of the preemptive point of time is pushed forward.
Now suppose that there is joint late adoption and therefore M = V 1 = V 2. This is the
case in which the point of preemption is not suﬃciently proﬁtable, so that both ﬁrms wait.
Insertion of the value functions given above for T1 = T2 yields
M = V 1,2(T2,T1) =
∫ T1
0
[π0(0) − τ ]e−rtdt +
∫ ∞
T2
π1(2)e−rtdt − c(T2). (13)
The optimal joint adoption time is found bymaximization ofM with respect toT = T1 = T2.
The ﬁrst-order condition is
dM
dT
= [π0(0) − τ ]e−rT − π1(2)e−rT − c′(T ) = 0. (14)
From this, we can calculate the impact of an increase in the environmental tax on the
timing of joint adoption:
dT
dτ
= − −e
−rT
−r[π0(0) − τ ]e−rT + rπ1(2)e−rT − c′′(T ) < 0. (15)
Proposition 2.3 Joint late adoption takes place earlier under a higher environmental tax.
We have shown that in all cases the environmental tax moves the timing of adoption
towards an earlier point in time. It is important to note that these results are to be expected.
In the next section, the analysis will be extended to the case in which we have unequal
environmental taxes.
2.2. Games of timing: international case
Now let us suppose that environmental regulation is one-sided. The ﬁrms are located in dif-
ferent countries. Firm 1 is located in ‘home’, and ﬁrm 2 is located in ‘foreign’, competing on
a third market without transport costs or tariﬀs. Foreign does not introduce any environmen-
tal regulation. Both the third market assumption and the fact that foreign does not introduce
any environmental regulation are simplifying – but for the ease of calculation necessary –
assumptions. The ﬁrst excludes in repercussions (on, e.g. welfare) of a competition in the
home country that a government would be interested in, whereas the second assumption of
no foreign environmental tax is simply the extreme case of having lower taxes.
Table 1 summarizes in general terms the payoﬀ for theﬁrms.Nowπ0(0) − τ are after-tax
proﬁts of the home ﬁrm and π0(0) for the foreign ﬁrm if no ﬁrm has yet adopted. π0(1) − τ
are after-tax proﬁts of the home ﬁrm if only the other ﬁrm has adopted and π0(1) for the
foreign ﬁrm. π1(1) is the proﬁt of the home ﬁrm which has adopted while the other, foreign
ﬁrm has not. π1(2) is the proﬁt of either ﬁrm if both have adopted. We use superscripts ‘h’
and ‘f ’ for home and foreign respectively.
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Table 1. Payoﬀ in the game of timing.
Foreign
Lead Follow
Home
Lead (Lh,Lf ) (Lh,Ff )
Follow (Fh,Lf ) (Fh,Ff )
As in the national case, let us ﬁrst examine the case in which the home ﬁrm is
precommitted to be the follower. In this case,
Fh ≡ V hF (Th2 ,T f1 ) =
∫ T f1
0
[π0(0) − τ ]e−rtdt +
∫ Th2
T f1
[π0(1) − τ ]e−rtdt
+
∫ ∞
Th2
π1(2)e−rtdt − c(Th2 ). (16)
And for the foreign, precommitted leader, we have
Lf ≡ V fL (T f1 ,Th2 ) =
∫ T f1
0
π0(0)e−rtdt +
∫ Th2
T f1
π1(1)e−rtdt
+
∫ ∞
Th2
π1(2)e−rtdt − c(T f1 ). (17)
Given that home follows, we can determine the optimal adoption time:
Th2 :
∂V hF
∂Th2
= [π0(1) − τ ]e−rT h2 − π1(2)e−rT h2 − c′(Th2 ) = 0. (18)
We can see that Th2 (r, τ) is independent of T1. Further, ∂T
h
2 /∂τ < 0. Hence, we can state
the following.
Proposition 2.4 Home, as the follower, adopts earlier if the environmental tax is larger,
decreasing the time that a foreign ﬁrm can reap the beneﬁts of early adoption.
Examining the impact of the environmental tax, τ , on the timing of the foreign leader,
we ﬁnd
T f1 :
∂V fL
∂T f1
= π0(0)e−rT
f
1 − π1(1)e−rT
f
1 − c′(T f1 ) = 0. (19)
Hence, T f1 is independent of τ and T
H
2 . The timing of foreign leadership is not aﬀected by
the tax τ imposed by the home government.
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Let us now turn to the case inwhich home is precommitted leader and foreign is follower:
Ff ≡ V fF (T f2 ,Th1 )=
∫ Th1
0
π0(0)e−rtdt +
∫ T f2
Th1
π0(1)e−rtdt +
∫ ∞
T f2
π1(2)e−rtdt − c(T f2 ),
(20)
Lh ≡ V hL (Th1 ,T f2 )=
∫ Th1
0
[π0(0)− τ ]e−rtdt +
∫ T f2
Th1
π1(1)e−rtdt +
∫ ∞
T f2
π1(2)e−rtdt − c(Th1 ).
(21)
Again, we can determine the optimal timing of T2, given that foreign is committed to
follow.
T f2 :
∂V fF
∂T f2
= π0(1)e−rT
f
2 − π1(2)e−rT
f
2 − c′(T f2 ) = 0. (22)
Once more, the timing of the foreign ﬁrm’s adoption, here T f2 , is independent of τ , but also
of the timing of early adoption Th1 . Further note that, T
H
2 < T
f
2 , because Equations (18)
and (22) diﬀer only by τ in Equation (18).
For the timing of home, as the precommitted leader, we get
Th1 :
∂V hL
∂Th1
= [π0(0) − τ ]e−rT h1 − π1(1)e−rT h1 − c′(Th1 ) = 0. (23)
Note that the time of adoption is earlier, the higher the environmental tax: ∂Th1 /∂τ < 0.
Home, as a leader, adopts faster than foreign as a leader, i.e. Th1 < T
f
1 because of
Equations (19) and (23).
Proposition 2.5 Foreign adopts slower – given that the environmental tax is smaller or
equal to zero – than the home ﬁrm both as leader and follower.
Returns to leadership and following
We have shown above that – under precommitment – home adopts earlier than the foreign
ﬁrm, both as a leader and as a follower. Hence, we can order all timings of adoption in the
following way: Th1 < T
f
1 < T
h
2 < T
f
2 , which is also depicted in Figure 1.
We have to make sure, though, that the ﬁrms actually want to be leader or follower. In
order to examine this, we have to examine the diﬀerence between leadership returns L and
follower returns F . Table 2 summarizes the payoﬀ, which will be speciﬁed below. Home
Figure 1. Timing of adoption under precommitment.
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Table 2. Preferences of the ﬁrm.
Foreign
Lead Follow
Home
Lead Lh − Fh > 0, Lh − Fh > 0,
Lf − Ff > 0 Lf − Ff < 0
Follow Lh − Fh < 0, Lh − Fh < 0,
Lf − Ff > 0 Lf − Ff < 0
would like to lead if Lh − Fh ≥ 0 and follow otherwise. Subtracting the maximized value
of Equation (16) from (21) yields
L∗h − F∗h =
∫ T ∗f1
T ∗h1 (τ )
[π1(1) − π0(0) + τ ]e−rtdt +
∫ T ∗h2 (τ )
T ∗f1
[π1(1) − π0(1) + τ ]e−rtdt
+
∫ T ∗f2
T ∗h2 (τ )
[π1(1) − π1(2)]e−rtdt − [c(T ∗h1 (τ )) − c(T ∗h2 (τ ))]. (24)
2.2.1. Preemption
Home will try to preempt as long as L∗h − F∗h > 0, and being the leader at the preemption
time T yields at least the same revenue as being a follower. At this point, the partial
diﬀerential of Equation (11), i.e. the ﬁrst proﬁtable time of preemption, with respect to the
height of the tax τ is evaluated:
∂Th1
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
Lh(Th1 )=Fh(T ∗h2 )
(25)
−
=
(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
−
∫ Th1
0
e−rtdt
(2)︷ ︸︸ ︷
+
∫ T ∗f1
0
e−rtdt
(3)︷ ︸︸ ︷
−[π0(1) − τ ]e−rT ∗h2 ∂T ∗h2 /∂τ
(4)︷ ︸︸ ︷
+
∫ T ∗h2
T ∗f1
e−rtdt
[π0(0) − τ ]e−rT h1 − π1(1)e−rT h1 − c′(Th1 )
(5)︷ ︸︸ ︷
π1(2)e−rT
∗h
2 ∂T ∗h2 /∂τ
(6)︷ ︸︸ ︷
+c′∂T ∗h2 /∂τ
[π0(0) − τ ]e−rT h1 − π1(1)e−rT h1 − c′(Th1 )
. (26)
The denominator is greater than zero as Lh − Fh = 0 is before (in time) the maximum. We
will evaluate the sign of the numerator by the parts indicated with the brackets above them:
The ﬁrst part (1)
−
[
1
−r e
−rt
]Th1
0
= −
[
1
−r e
−rT h1 − 1−r
]
< 0 as Th1 > 0 (27)
has the economic interpretation that the environmental tax reduces the proﬁt of leadership
in the ﬁrst phase, and therefore the ﬁrst proﬁtable time of adoption is later.
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The second part (2) is greater than zero:
∫ T ∗f1
0
e−rtdt =
[
1
−r e
−rt
]T ∗f1
0
= 1−r
[
e−rT
∗f
1 − 1
]
> 0 as T ∗1 > 0. (28)
The tax reduces the follower proﬁt in the ﬁrst phase, and the company has an earlier ﬁrst
proﬁtable time of adoption.
The third, ﬁfth, and sixth terms are all zero, as the envelope theorem applies to F∗h, and
therefore ∂Th∗2 /∂τ -terms sum to zero and drop out.
The fourth term ensures that ∂Th1 /∂τ < 0, i.e. earlier preemption point of time for
home with higher environmental taxation. Hence, the taxation insures that the home ﬁrm
always accepts earlier preemption times than foreign, because taxes guarantee lower proﬁts
as follower, and will thus win preemption games with certainty (rather than with a 50%
chance).
Proposition 2.6 A non-adoption tax in one country ensures that the ﬁrm in that country
can preempt earlier than the ﬁrm in the other country. This establishes the order of adoption
and therefore the precommitment case becomes relevant, where the home ﬁrm gets higher
proﬁts than in the preemption game.
2.2.2. Joint late adoption
Another possibility is that both ﬁrms prefer to defer the investment in the new technology,
yielding a joint late adoption equilibrium: M (t) = V (t, t).
The value function for foreign will then be:
Mf (t) =
∫ Tˆ1
0
π0(0)e−rtdt +
∫ ∞
Tˆ1
π1(2)e−rtdt − c(t). (29)
The value function for the home ﬁrm mirrors that of the foreign ﬁrm, with the inclusion of
the environmental tax for the non-adoption time.
Mh(t) =
∫ Tˆ1
0
[π0(0) − τ ]e−rtdt +
∫ ∞
Tˆ1
π1(2)e−rtdt − c(t). (30)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for c(t) are
∂Mf
∂Tˆ1
= π0(0)e−rTˆ1 − π1(2)e−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0
= (π0(0) − π1(2))e−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0, (31)
∂Mh
∂Tˆ1
= (π0(0) − τ − π1(2))e−rTˆ1 − c′(Tˆ1) = 0. (32)
This environmental tax destroys late adoption, as it leads to earlier adoption than the for-
eign ﬁrm, hence destroying the joint late adoption equilibrium. If under some circumstances
joint late adoption was the equilibrium outcome among equal ﬁrms, it will be destroyed by
the environmental tax levied asymmetrically on the home ﬁrm.
Proposition 2.7 Even small taxes create a precommitment against (late) joint adoption.
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2.2.3. Returns to leadership
The change of ‘leadership returns’ with respect to the environmental tax, τ , for home is
evaluated below. Diﬀerentiation with respect to Th1 sums up to zero when the envelope
theorem is applied to Lh and those with respect to Th2 when it is applied to F
h. Therefore,
only the direct eﬀects matter.
∂(Lh − Fh)
∂τ
=
∫ T f1
Th1 (τ )
e−rtdt +
∫ Th2 (τ )
T f1
e−rtdt
=
[
−1
r
e−rt
]T f1
Th1
+
[
−1
r
e−rt
]Th2
T f1
= −1
r
[
e−rT
f
1 − e−rT h1
]
− 1
r
[
e−rT
h
2 − e−rT f1
]
(33)
= −1
r
[
e−rT
h
1 − e−rT h2
]
> 0.
A higher non-adoption tax increases the desire to lead, because it reduces proﬁts from
followership, Fh, more than from leadership, Lh. Similarly, the foreign ﬁrm would like to
lead if Lf − Ff ≥ 0.
Lf − Ff =
∫ T f1
Th1
[π0(0) − π0(1)]e−rtdt +
∫ Th2
T f1
[π1(1) − π0(1)]e−rtdt
+
∫ T f2
Th2
[π1(2) − π0(1)]e−rtdt − [c(T f1 ) − c(T f2 )]. (34)
Now the eﬀect of the ‘home tax’ on foreign’s willingness to lead (or follow) is captured in
the following derivative:
∂(Lf − Ff )
∂τ
= −[π0(0) − π0(1)]e−rT h1 ∂T
h
1
∂τ
+ π1(1)e−rT h2 ∂T
h
2
∂τ
− π1(2)e−rT h2 ∂T
h
2
∂τ
. (35)
We cannot fully sign the derivative.7 Therefore, we give a numerical simulation in the next
subsection.
2.3. Simulations
The cost function in these numerical simulations will be parametrized as c(t) = 100e−αt .
The assumption of c′ < 0 and c′′ > 0 are then fulﬁlled for all economically sensible
parameter values of α ∈ R+.
The parameter α can be interpreted as one of technological advancement, lowering the
cost of adoption over time.
We have parametrized the proﬁts after innovation using an additional parameter x,
indicating the increase in proﬁts through the new technology, denoting long-run advantage
of the new technology. Note that this advantage is lasting even after the follower has also
adopted. For the diﬀerent parameter values that we have tried, refer to Table 3.8 In case 3, we
ﬁnd the possibilities for preemption and precommitment. In the other case, there is no case
of preemption because the short-run gain is too low. In the simulation that we will discuss
extensively in this section, case 3, we set the interest rate to be r = 0.04 and the cost decrease
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Table 3. Simulation parameters and results.
Case π0(1) π0(0) π1(2) π1(1) α r z · c Result
1 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.2 0.04 100c Precommit
2 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.1 0.04 200c Precommit
3 1.9 2 2 + x 3.1 + x 0.1 0.04 100c Preempt or precommit
4 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.1 0.04 100c Precommit
of adopting the new technology over time to be α = 0.1. We assume that the returns gross of
adoption costs are π0(1) = 1.9,π0(0) = 2,≤ π1(2) = 2 + x < π1(1) = 3.1 + x. In words,
being a follower decreases the proﬁts by 5%, whereas the (temporary) leader gains more
than 50% in the short run plus some value x = π1(2) − π0(0) gross of cost of adoption in the
long run. This value of x remains after the follower has caught up and also implemented
the new technology. Setting x to zero thus would indicate that – at least in terms of proﬁts –
no advantage of adoption would remain.
The timing of technology adoption can be calculated both for given (precommitted)
leadership and followership according to Equations (18), (19), (22), and (23). Figure 2
plots the timing of adoption for various levels of x or y ≡ x + τ for foreign and home,
respectively. The inner line plots the timing given a ﬁrm’s precommitment to leading, and
the outer line gives the optimal time of adoption given precommitment to follow.
As this ﬁgure is based on precommitment, we have to show that ﬁrms actually want to
be leader or follower. If, for example, both ﬁrms would want to lead, a game of preemption
will occur in which earlier points of times are chosen than those given in Figure 2. We will
deal with preemption further below.
In Figure 3,we plotL − F values for both home and foreign (cf. Equations (24) and (34))
for various levels of x and y ≡ x + τ . L − F is the proﬁt from leading minus proﬁts from
following, and hence as long as it is positive, a ﬁrm will attempt to be the ﬁrst to adopt.
The ﬁgure graphically illustrates this situation for the home and foreign ﬁrm. The area in
which the L − F area is above zero, home would like to lead. Areas that are overlapping
between those two ﬁgures indicate regions of pre-emption. Note that x has the interpretation
as above, i.e. continued gain in proﬁts through technology, while y is deﬁned as the sum of
x + τ . For the chosen parameter speciﬁcation and cost functions, the 45◦ line of x = y, i.e.
no environmental tax, is an overlapping region in which both home and foreign would like
Figure 2. Timing of technology adoption under pre-commitment.
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Figure 3. Willingness to lead: L − F .
to lead. Hence, preemption would take place by each ﬁrm with a 50% chance (Fudenberg
and Tirole 1987). However, for large τ > 0, i.e. x < y = x + τ , we can see that both ﬁrms
are pulled out of the preemption area and home will be the leader (L − F is positive for
the home ﬁrm), whereas foreign prefers to follow (L − F is negative for the foreign ﬁrm).
Only for small values of x and τ will preemption take place.
Proposition 2.8 If the short-term gain is large enough to allow for a preemption case,
low environmental taxes induce a preemption game, which is certainly won by the home
ﬁrm. The foreign ﬁrm will not want to play it. The order of adoption being established,
there will be a precommitment outcome of the game. High non-adoption taxes induce a
precommitment for the home ﬁrm to be the leader directly.
In Figure 4, the ‘height’ gives the ﬁrst proﬁtable time T of preemption. Note that the
points of time are decreasing for home with the y-axis, whereas they are decreasing for
foreign along the x-axis. Preemption should result with low τ and precommitment with
high environmental taxes τ . In the case of a preemption game, the lower x is (along the 45◦
line) and the higher τ us (moving parallel to the y-axis), within the preemption range, the
later will be the ﬁrst proﬁtable point of preemption for the foreign ﬁrm. For home, higher
environmental taxes lead to earlier proﬁtable points of preemption. Hence, home will have
an earlier proﬁtable preemption point of time for any τ > 0, therefore, it will preempt just
before foreign’s ﬁrst proﬁtable point of preemption (which yields higher proﬁts than home’s
ﬁrst proﬁtable point and is suﬃcient to be the ﬁrst one to preempt). We can then calculate
the proﬁts of preemption as a function of x and τ . Increasing τ leads to lower preemption
proﬁts. Figure 5 summarizes the proﬁts of home as a function of x and y = x + τ . The
left ﬁgure gives the proﬁts under preemption as a function of x and y = x + τ . Proﬁts are
increasing along the 45◦ line, and an increase in τ will lower the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. This
implies that an environmental taxation does not lead to higher proﬁts of the ﬁrms in games
of preemption. The right part of Figure 5 gives the proﬁts under precommitment: for small
values of x (and τ ), an increase in environmental taxation will lead to lower proﬁts. Under
high levels, this is reversed. Only in this last case, the Porter hypothesis would be supported.
However, these high values of y imply negative adoption times and therefore have to be
excluded, which one can show by cutting oﬀ the graph at the value of y at which there is
immediate adoption.
Proposition 2.9 Proﬁts under preemption are lower, the larger the non-adoption tax, and
proﬁts under precommitment are lower for higher taxes.
For all other numerical values which do not violate the assumptions of the model, we
found results that are qualitatively identical.
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Figure 4. Preemption point of time.
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Figure 5. Home’s proﬁts for preemption and precommitment.
We have shown in this last section that environmental regulation can be beneﬁcial in the
strategic games of timing to allow the home ﬁrm to lead and avoid preemption. One should
bear in mind that this numerical example was contrived and is speciﬁc to the parameter
values at hand. Many other scenarios can be thought of, which might be just as compelling.
Nevertheless, we have shown that an environmental tax allows for a quicker adoption, and
a longer time of ‘leadership’ under precommitment and a shorter time of followership in
general. Proﬁts of the ﬁrm, however, are not higher. Higher taxes decrease the proﬁts in the
ﬁrst phase of Equation (13) and induce a longer second phase (T f2 is unaﬀected by τ ) and
a shorter ﬁrst phase and higher adoption costs. The net eﬀect is negative.
Corollary 2.1 In case of precommitment under no environmental tax, the introduction of
a tax decreases proﬁts (anti-Porter). In case of a preemption game under no environmental
tax, the introduction of a small tax allows the home ﬁrm to win the preemption game, and
thus establishes an order of adoption. This leads to a precommitment case which assures
higher proﬁts of the home ﬁrm compared with the preemption game (pro-Porter).
In essence,we have constructed an example of theweak version of the Porter hypothesis,
as ﬁrms – maximizing their proﬁts – are pulled out of an equal chance preemption equilib-
rium in such a way that the ﬁrm constrained by the environmental regulation adopts earlier
with certainty. Competitiveness in the sense of winning a preemption game is enhanced.
Non-environmental as well as environmental welfare is enhanced for consumers of home,
as they get higher quality and cleaner products earlier.
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3. Optimal timing
In order to obtain a welfare function, we can enhance the proﬁt functions (8), (9), (12),
and (13) by adding an environmental damage function, −D, consumer beneﬁts, S, and
tax revenues. Tax revenues and payments then drop out. In the simplest case of a process
innovationwith no change in consumer beneﬁts, we then only have to add the environmental
damage function. Assuming, again for simplicity, that pollution is only national, then a
simple assumption for a damage function is
Dji =
∫ T ji
0
d0e−rtdt +
∫ ∞
T ji
d1e−rtdt with i = 1, 2, j = h, f , (36)
depending on whether the country is the home or the foreign country and is adopting ﬁrst
or second. d0 is the environmental damage per period before adoption and d1 after the
adoption. When taking the time derivatives, this will augment the functions (10), (11), (14),
and (15) (without tax term) by the term
−(d0e−rT
j
i − d1e−rT
j
i ). (37)
This term appears where taxes appeared before and have dropped out when canceled against
the revenue term. By implication, the old and the new equations are the same in the special
case where
τ = d0 − d1 > 0. (38)
In this case, the taxwould be a Pigouvian policy instrument, not taking into account strategic
interactions between ﬁrms and governments. The eﬀect of taking into account damages then
is the same as that of taxes as analyzed above: all adoption times are earlier than without
taking into account taxes or damages, respectively. In the Cournot literature cited above,
the tax was reduced in the second stage game between governments because of the strategic
interactions. We do not carry out such a second stage game because it is tractable only in
a numerical way anyway and probably not something that governments can reasonably be
expected to do for every adoption problem. We did show above that a small tax by one
government only may be enough to move the preemption position from a 50/50 chance to
one of zero to the home ﬁrm. However, if the tax is increased further, proﬁts fall. On the
other hand, a higher tax generates an earlier ﬁrst proﬁtable time of adoption and therefore a
strategic advantage in a second stage game. This might give an incentive for governments
to put their value above the Pigouvian one. If both governments decide to have the same tax
in a symmetric game, there is no impact on the ﬁrst proﬁtable time of adoption. Home must
have a slightly larger tax than foreign, other things equal. The foreign tax can be normalized
to unity. Therefore, we concentrated on Porter’s case of a one-sided tax. Our analysis as
presented above, however, is not limited to a Pigouvian tax, but rather can have any value.
Extending thewelfare function for consumer beneﬁts in case of delivery to thirdmarkets
only is slightly more complicated. It would imply, in one of the possible models we could
imagine, considering international welfare and therefore the sum of the proﬁt functions for
home and foreign. Consumer beneﬁts then are increased twice, ﬁrst, when the ﬁrst ﬁrm
adopts and oﬀers a better quality probably at a higher price and, second, when the second
ﬁrm adopts and price competition decreases the price of the better variant. The formal
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treatment then requires adding consumer beneﬁts
Sji =
∫ T j1
0
s0e−rtdt +
∫ T j2
T j1
s1e−rtdt +
∫ ∞
T j2
s2e−rtdt with j = h, f (39)
to the sum of Equations (8) and (10) or that of Equations (12) and (13) using the adequate
j, h, or f , after adding the environmental damage function and dropping the tax terms
as above. We leave the exploration of details to the interested reader, noting that it is an
international optimum now, obtained as an enhanced joint proﬁt-maximization problem. It
can serve only as a benchmark but not as a recommendation for any international institution,
because there is no one deciding on technology adoption or caring for consumer beneﬁts
in the sense of this model. A second model we could imagine would be one where welfare
is deﬁned as national proﬁts plus beneﬁts of customers abroad. Then a consumer beneﬁt
function could be written down, which is completely symmetric to the damage function
above. The tax term τ would then be replaced by d0 − d1 − (s0 − s1) > d0 − d1 in the
conditions for optimal timing and the marginal consumer beneﬁt would do the same as a
tax or the marginal damage, that is inducing earlier adoption times.9
4. Tests of the Porter hypothesis: a theory guided interpretation
4.1. Empirical methods and reformulations of the hypothesis
The essence of the Porter hypothesis is that static calculations of the cost of environmental
regulation ignore innovation. If the latter is taken into account, costs are lower and in some
cases proﬁts are even enhanced. Based on this, one would expect that analyses, which
take into account innovation and have a long-run perspective, should give more lower cost
estimates than the static ones or those that ignore technical change. However, what the
adequate formulation of the hypothesis is, depends also on the methods which empirical
studies use. PL use case studies while others use regression analysis, often in combination
with distance functions approaches.
As PL base their arguments on case studies, it is worth emphasizing that they only
claim that ‘In some cases, these “innovation oﬀsets” can exceed the cost of compliance.’
(PL 1995a, 101). This is a fairly weak claim. Stronger formulations, which are cited by
some authors, go always accompanied by multiple qualiﬁcations of PL, which are some-
times underreported by the authors.What was later called a ‘weak version’ of the hypothesis
diﬀers in its deﬁnition from paper to paper. This is also due to diﬀerences in emphasis on
competitiveness, proﬁts, factor productivity, and productive eﬃciency either in all markets
or in just environmental goods. This requires to go beyond the question whether the Porter
hypothesis is right or wrong. Rather we should answer under which conditions and circum-
stances it is right or wrong. With case study methods – which may be quite a bit more than
just anecdotal evidence – it is straightforward to expect diﬀerentiations as to the question,
under which conditions the hypothesis holds. In regression analysis, one typically looks at
the sign and signiﬁcance of a coeﬃcient. Here we can get more detailed information when
comparing forwhich samples the Porter hypothesis holds andwhere it does not. In particular,
the question from the perspective of economic theory as discussed above is for each data set,
whether or not it consists of ﬁrms or other units for which one can expect perfect eﬃciency
as in the neoclassical ﬁrst-principles view, or alternatively, to have situations with agency
costs, X-ineﬃciencies, and managerial slackness, which is emphasized by PL and others,
and ﬁnally, whether the situation can be described like strategic problems emphasized by
the industrial organization literature. Only in the latter two cases we can have innovation
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
Ma
as
tr
ic
ht
] 
At
: 
07
:5
9 
24
 J
ul
y 
20
09
Economics of Innovation and New Technology 285
oﬀsets either for environmental goods or for all goods and ﬁrm performance criteria such as
(current) proﬁts, productivity changes, productive eﬃciency, or competitiveness. We will
look at this question for all investigations, which have been made with explicit reference
to the Porter hypothesis either in the title or in the abstract.10
4.2. Case studies
There are many case studies that deal with the eﬀect of environmental regulation or taxation
on the adaption of new production process, both with and without explicit reference to the
Porter hypothesis. We concentrate on the latter cases, without pretending that this overview
is exhaustive, rather it should serve as a means to compare them with the theoretical results
of the previous section.11
Ayres (1994) describes some cases in the utilities and the chemical industry. In particular,
Ayres’ case studyof ‘DowChemicals’ shows that for decennia, theﬁrmhasmade investment
plans irrespective of environmental considerations and then has sent an environmental task
force to check for environmental gains,which could produce gains from this second stage for
decennia. This is clearly a case of adoption of environmental technologies of the retroﬁtting
type. Adoption can result in an advantage, but only as long as competitors do not do the same
thing. Putting then more pressure through environmental policy to do this earlier induces a
competitive advantage if done in one country only.
In the Green light program of the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), now
called Energy Star, participating ﬁrms obtained an advice on eﬃcient lighting, heating and
cooling operations for free from the USEPA. Besides the awareness eﬀect, this free advice
is an implicit subsidy. The measures taken according to such advice had payback times
below two years. Obviously, a ﬁrm has an advantage vis-à-vis a competitor only as long as
the competitors have not participated as well and obtained a similar free advice (PL 1995a,
99). As far as foreign competitors are concerned, Sweden and the UK followed the USA
and so did the EU in 2000.12 In the meanwhile, Americans saved $12 billions in 2005, of
which 1.2 billions was saved by industry (EPA 2005, Table 1)13 providing a competitive
advantage.
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs provided EUR 425 million for subsidies for
investments of ﬁrms supporting a CO2-reduction plan during 1997–2002. A similar pro-
gram was carried out by the Dutch Ministry of Traﬃc and Infrastructure in 2002–05 for
investments in the transport of goods and persons, supporting a volume of ¤40 million
additional investments, compared to a business as usual scenario, with a subsidy of ¤9.1
million buying 160,000 ton CO2 reduction per year to be realized by 2010 for ¤10 per ton.
For 2006–07, a similar program will be carried out with ¤6 million in subsidies. Again it
is obvious that a competitive advantage can be obtained by a ﬁrm only as long as domestic
competitors do not use the program and foreign competitors cannot use a similar program
of their own government.14
When the Montreal Protocol and the US Clean Air act forbade the use of CFCs, the ﬁrm
Raytheon adopted a semi-aqueous terpene-based cleaning agent that was of better quality
and was produced under lower operating costs. Without mandating the drop of CFCs, this
would not have been achieved (PL 1995a, 101). As there was an almost costless alternative,
no tax or subsidy was necessary. However, there was a tax on ozone-depleting materials,
with an exception for HCFCs replacing the CFCs. This was to the advantage of DuPont,
the major producer of HCFCs and its clients (Albrecht 1998a, 1998b).
When a US city threatened to close a jewellery ﬁrm (Robbins) because of toxic water
pollution, the new system adopted reduced pollution of the water and at the same time
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increased the product quality of the plating, hence competitiveness was improved (PL
1995a, 102). The threat is similar to a non-adoption tax but of course more drastic.
Ciba-Geigy reconsidered its wastewater streams because of new standards. Through a
reduction of iron components in a diet, they increased yields by 40% while reducing toxic
releases into the wastewater. This resulted in cost savings of US$ 740,000 (PL 1995a, 102).
Again, standards are similar to non-adoption taxes in that they impose costs, but are of
course diﬀerent in other aspects.15
In the second case of Table 4, there is an explicit subsidy. At ﬁrst, there is a freely
available service. Subsidies contain two elements: a pressure and a gain. In the other cases,
there are standards, laws, or threats, which combine the elements of pressure and an inno-
vation oﬀset, either in the product or in the process of production. PL provide more cases
of pressure from standards and laws with innovation oﬀsets. Not in all cases do we get the
full information to check for proﬁtability. However, it is mostly evident that consumers
will beneﬁt and ﬁrms will react only after some pressure, and in ‘some cases’ (PL 1995a,
101) the ﬁrm gets more proﬁts. What is essential for our model is the similarity of pressure
from laws and standards with innovation oﬀsets with the subsidy for adoption or a tax for
non-adoption. Moreover, all examples relate to non-immediate adoption, its timing and ﬁrst
mover advantage (and not to R&D, patenting, scrapping, or capital composition,16 which
do not appear in the PL articles but are of course also fascinating subjects on their own),
and to multinationals in severe international competition.
Roediger-Schluga (2003) has conducted several rounds of interviews in 1999 with
heads of R&D divisions of 28 ﬁrms of Austrian manufacturers of printing inks, paints,
coatings, and adhesives (SITC 5332, 5334, 59227, 59229) who were confronted with prod-
uct and process standards for volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in 1996.17 These ﬁrms
spend on average 50% of their R&D budgets for compliance with these standards. Single
establishment ﬁrms spent a higher share on compliance R&D. There is no deterioration of
competitiveness: small ﬁrms report to have been negatively aﬀected, but large ﬁrms report
to have beneﬁted. This clearly points to innovation oﬀsets. Firms report to have adapted
their product range, and 15 out of 26 had obtained fresh ideas for new products. Displace-
ments of other R&D decline with ﬁrm size. Compared with PL, who cautiously talk of
‘some cases’, Roediger-Schluga adds additional cases. Beyond that, his contribution lies
in the well-deﬁned sample: it is possible to examine exactly how many cases do or do not
correspond to the Porter hypothesis. The small ﬁrms for which he ﬁnds no support of the
Porter hypothesis are neither those whom you expect to have much managerial ineﬃciency
as emphasized by PL, the agency cost interpretation, or the X-ineﬃciency interpretation,
Table 4. Examples.
Example Institution Tax or subsidy equivalent
Green light program USEPA Free advice available to all competitors
(Energy Stars)
CO2 reduction plan Dutch Ministries Subsidy via tax deduction
CFC, Raytheon Montreal Protocol Tax break on HCFCs US Clean Air Act
Ciba-Geigy Standards Standards are almost tax equivalent
wastewater
Robbins City’s threat of closure Threat is similar to non-adoption tax,
toxic water pollution
Hitachi, Waste Japanese recycling law Law is similar to tax equivalent
German laws on CHP and
renewable energy
Subsidy on market price; speciﬁed as
ﬁxed money amount
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nor are they expected to be involved in strategic competition as emphasized by the industrial
organization literature to which our model belongs.
4.3. Distance functions cum regression
It is almost inherent to the distance function approach that the method detects ineﬃciencies
of some degree because by construct the eﬃciency has an upper bound of unity, D≤1, and
no disturbances may bring it to a higher value.
Boyd, Tolley, and Pang (2002) use distance functions and Malmquist–Luenberger
indices for the NOx emissions and the productivity of the US container glass industry.
They show that almost half of all plants have ineﬃciencies in regard to productivity and
the environment, as suggested by the Porter hypothesis. Nevertheless, tougher regulations
would address all plants and therefore would be costly. Ineﬃciencies of >10% are not
observed frequently. The overall impression is that some ﬁrms within the industries are
very eﬃcient, but not all. The paper does not give the impression that strategic issues are
relevant here. Therefore, it contains ‘some cases’, but is not dominated by oﬀsets.
Murty and Kumar (2003) use the distance function approach for 92 water-polluting
ﬁrms. Regressing the eﬃciency measure on a measure of regulation intensity and other
variables, they ﬁnd that regulation enhances eﬃciency. Eﬃciencies are indeed low ranging,
from a maximum eﬃciency of 0.62 to a minimum of 0.086. One does not need strategic
issues here to guess that almost any reasonable change can only improve the eﬃciency.
Kumar and Rao (2003) regress ineﬃciency results according to the distance function
approach on regulation measures and other variables for 33 Indian thermal power plants,
half ofwhich have eﬃciency at or below 0.5. Environmental standards signiﬁcantly increase
ineﬃciency, contrary towhat the Porter hypothesis states. As ineﬃciency is large, onemight
have expected the opposite. The Porter hypothesis obviously does not apply here. However,
the authors conclude that this is due to insuﬃciently strict standards, implying insuﬃcient
pressure.
Managi (2004) investigates the impact of environmental regulation on Luenberger
productivity indices of US agricultural output and distinguishes between all output, and
environmental output. He ﬁnds evidence in regard to the environmental output, but not
for all output. This is not surprising, as agriculture is neither characterized by problems
of attracting managerial time, attention, and information – as emphasized by PL – nor
is it in the context of the typical international strategic competition of the PL examples
or our model. Managi et al. (2005) ﬁnd the same result applying the same method to
406 ﬁelds in the oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico, which is responsible for
24% of US production. Obviously, 406 ﬁelds are unlikely to play the games typically
formulated in the industrial organization literature and our model. Moreover, gas and oil
plants are well known to be so highly mechanized that they are unlikely to give rise to the
X-eﬃciency or agency problems, which are typical of long hierarchies and comprehensive
bureaucracies of large ﬁrms, and therefore other reasons for the ineﬃciencies found by the
distance function need to be found. Unfortunately, the authors do not give us the results
of the eﬃciency measures but rather report fairly conventional TFP growth results. Again,
in a simple yes/no type of question, this might seem to be an anti-Porter result, but with
some eye on the more sophisticated arguments of PL, one easily sees that these are not the
cases where one should expect unused innovation oﬀsets through managerial slackness or
strategic advantages.
Marklund (2003) applies the distance function approach to 12 plants of the Swedish
pulp industry. The technical eﬃciency scores are regressed on an environmental regulation
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index. The result is a negative but insigniﬁcant eﬀect. This means that there are neither cost
increases as predicted by conventional theory nor innovation oﬀsets to an extent leading
to positive proﬁts, but still they reach zero. The existence of 12 plants may guarantee
enough competition to be sure that the imperfect competitionmodels are irrelevant for them,
provided decisions are made at the plant level. The causes of the technical ineﬃciencies,
estimated using distance functions, are not analyzed in the paper.
In regard to the debate about the X-ineﬃciency of ﬁrms, it is remarkable that all studies
ﬁnd some ineﬃciencies,18 but only in the two Indian cases are they large and in one of these
do we get strong oﬀsets. ‘Some cases’ as formulated by PL can be found in the papers by
Boyd, Murty and Kumar, and Marklund. US agriculture and gas and oil (Managi 2004) as
well as Indian thermal power (Kumar and Rao) are not examples of sectors where one can
ﬁnd any support for PL.
4.4. Other regression analyses
Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997) state explicitly that they do not want to test the Porter hypothesis.
They ﬁnd that the lagged compliance cost variable has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on
R&D expenditures, but an insigniﬁcantly negative impact on patenting. They interpret the
overall result as inconclusive in regard to the Porter hypothesis. We would like to add
though that R&D expenditures are costs and not oﬀsets, although they bear the potential for
oﬀsets in the future. But this is not exactly captured by the approach applied here. For low
pay-back times, this should be possible, but not for diﬀusion processes that take decennia.
Albrecht (1998a,1998b) regresses the change of bilateral exports of refrigerators for
households (SITC 7752), industry (7414), and air conditioning (7415) from 1989 (one year
after the detection of the ozone problem) to 1995 (one year before the phasing out of CFCs)
on several variables, including a dummy for the early adoption of policies against the use of
CFCs. For both refrigerator groups, these dummies have clearly positive eﬀects and provide
strong evidence for the Porter hypothesis.
Berman and Bui (2001) ﬁnd that petroleum reﬁneries at the US South coast were having
productivity gains of about 5% compared with other areas with less environmental regula-
tion in a panel analysis with ﬁxed eﬀects. They attribute the corresponding non-adoption of
these other areas to uncertainty about cost and eﬃcacy of new technologies and future envi-
ronmental regulation, which corresponds to ‘managerial information’ in the words of PL.
Lanoie, Patry, and Lageunesse (2001) make an explicit distinction – in a regression
of total factor productivity of 17 manufacturing industry sectors for the years 1985–94 –
between short- and long-run eﬀects by using four lags of the regressor ‘investment in
pollution abatement equipment’. They ﬁnd that the Porter hypothesis holds for the less
polluting industries and for those which are more exposed to foreign competition. The
eﬀects are negative for the contemporaneous investments and for those lagged by one-year,
but positive for the second through fourth lag, with later, positive eﬀects dominating the
earlier negative ones. For the more polluting industries and those less exposed to foreign
competition, there are only insigniﬁcant results. Other papers do not have somuch emphasis
on the distinction between short- and long-run eﬀects.
Alpay, Buccola, and Kerkvliet (2002) provide full information maximum likelihood
estimates of a translog version of a restricted short-run proﬁt function for the food manufac-
turing sector of Mexico and the USA. Using these estimates, they can show that in Mexico,
proﬁts are decreased through environmental regulation but productivity is enhanced. The
authors speak of a ‘strongly conﬁrmed Porter hypothesis’. For the USA, however, they ﬁnd
that eﬀects on both proﬁts and productivity are negligibly small.
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Table 5. Eﬀects of environmental regulation on ﬁrm, plant, or sector performance.
Level Authors Eﬀect on Sign
Dow Chemicals Ayres (1994) Proﬁts +
Austrian VOC standard Roediger-Schluga (2003) Product innovation (oth.) +
US container glass Boyd, Tolley, and
Pang (2002)
Productivity, environment ±
US agriculture Managi (2004) Productivity output −
US agriculture Managi (2004) Productivity environment
output
+
US oil and gas Managi et al. (2005) Productivity output −
US oil and gas Managi et al. (2005) Productivity environment
output
+
Indian water pollution Murty and Kumar (2003) Production eﬃciency +
Indian thermal power Kumar and Rao (2003) Production eﬃciency −
Swedish pulp Marklund (2003) Production eﬃciency +
US manufacturing Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997) R&D +
US manufacturing Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997) Patents ±
Fridge CFC use Albrecht (1998a, 1998b) Export change +
US Petrol reﬁnery Berman and Bui (2001) Productivity +
Quebec manufacturing Lanoie, Patry, and
Lajeunesse (2001)
Productivity +
Mexican food Alpay, Buccola, and
Kerkvliet (2002)
Productivity (proﬁts) + (−)
US food Alpay, Buccola, and
Kerkvliet (2002)
Productivity (proﬁts) ± (±)
Dutch agro Wossink and Weferink
(2003)
Family income −
NOx Swedish Industry Isaksson (2005) Cost of abatement +
SO2 abatement de Vries and Withagen
(2005)
Patenting abatem.
technology
+
Note: + denotes an increase, −a decrease of the eﬀect, whereas ± denotes an unclear or insigniﬁcant result.
Wossink and Weferink (2003) regress income of Dutch farmers on the phosphate
regulation standards and ﬁnd that less tough standards lead to higher income. Of course,
in Dutch agriculture, one would neither expect imperfect competition nor X-ineﬃciency,
given Holland’s legendary thriftiness.
Isaksson (2005) ﬁnds positive but low costs for NOX abatement of 114 plants of three
Swedish industries. As the Swedish Environmental protection Agency is told to have had
low monitoring cost, the same is likely to hold for the management. Moreover, plants
are reported to be small and competitive. By implication, there seem to be neither large
management imperfections nor strategic, imperfect competition issues. These plants seem
to come close to the no-imperfection benchmark of the ﬁrst-principles textbook and the
anti-Porter views.
In deVries andWithagen (2005), panel data estimates for 14 countries show that sulphur
emissions have a positive impact on patenting of abatement technologies.
In the latter group of studies, those dealing more explicitly with dynamics provide more
support for the Porter hypothesis than the other approaches. Three studies on Dutch and
US agriculture and Swedish industries have clear anti-Porter results. Five others provide
support and one is neutral.
Summarizing, Ayres (1994) and Roediger-Schluga (2003) use ﬁrm-level case stud-
ies as PL do and ﬁnd indeed ‘some cases’ as claimed by PL that have increased in
competitiveness as perceived by ﬁrms. As PL had made a claim only on ‘some cases’,
it should be clear that indeed they themselves found some cases for enhanced proﬁtability,
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and Roediger-Schluga (2003) found some cases of enhanced perceived competitiveness.
Berman and Bui (2001) and Alpay, Buccola, and Kerkvliet (2002) found cases of enhanced
productivity. Albrecht (1998a, 1998b) found cases of changes in exports, Lanoie, Patry, and
Lajeunesse (2001) found cases of changes in productivity, Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997) found
positive impacts on R&D, and de Vries and Withagen (2005) found positive impacts on
patenting. Some sectors, which seemingly have either no ineﬃciencies or no strategic power
give no support for the Porter hypothesis: Dutch agriculture (Wossink and Weferink), US
agriculture and gas and oil (Managi), Indian thermal power (Kumar and Rao), and Swedish
industry.
Anti-Porter results are either related (i) to small ﬁrms in terms of low numbers of
employees and the absence of both management problems and international strategic com-
petition emphasized by the industrial organization literature, or (ii) to short-run methods
(Alpay, Buccola, and Kerkvliet 2002), or (iii) to command-and-control methods in envi-
ronmental policies (Kumar and Rao). Pro-Porter results are obtained in cases where there
is no presumption against X-ineﬃciency, agency costs, and managerial slackness or infor-
mation problems. Typically in large ﬁrms with large bureaucracies, it has a crucial impact
of environmental policy on strategic behaviour, which again is only the case when market
power is present and therefore is empirically more likely to be observed for large ﬁrms.
In short, we ﬁnd that the evidence, in our interpretation, is not contradicting the theory.
When the investigated sample consists of many plants or ﬁrms in narrowly deﬁned sectors,
imperfect competition is absent and so are strategic issues. If samples consist of small
ﬁrms, X-ineﬃciency is unlikely to occur. In these two cases, one cannot expect the Porter
hypothesis to hold. In other samples this is diﬀerent. Cases supporting the Porter hypothesis
can be found in samples where the properties of (large) ﬁrms with strategic behaviour or
X-ineﬃciency, agency costs, and managerial slackness or information problems cannot be
rejected a priori. But it also raises a new question: if the managerial time, alertness, and
information are redirected by environmental regulation, where are they distracted from and
atwhat costs?Themethods used in the literature discussed above seemsnot to be particularly
designed for these type of questions, and others may be required. An alternative explanation
is that emphasis on environmental regulation leads ﬁrms to search for new combinations of
inputs which are only found because of the regulatory pressure. These ideas point more to
imperfect technical information and local learning in the neighbourhood of environmentally
relevant aspects of technologies.
In regard to our theoretical result, that a tax turns a preemption game into a pre-
commitment game and provides an international advantage, PL (1995a, 104–5) have three
supporting case studies fromGermany, Scandinavia, and theUSA.Roediger-Schluga (2003)
has a data set from Austria, as discussed above, in which the large ﬁrms are exposed to and
gain in foreign competition in their own perception. Albrecht (1998a, 1998b) found that
ﬁrms in countries with early policy adoption have higher export changes for household and
industry refrigerators. Lanoie, Patry, and Lajeunesse (2001) ﬁnd that exposition to more
foreign rather than domestic competition is more favourable for the Porter hypothesis. This
provides some support but also leaves room for more empirical research emphasizing inter-
national competition and intertemporal aspects explicitly. Testing our own results will be
diﬃcult because the argument of Smith andWalsh (2000) that the counterfactual will always
be missing applies all the more to the preemption game where a ﬁrm wins (looses) with a
50% chance ex-ante, but ex-post the probabilities are zero after having lost and unity after
having won. The ex-ante probabilities will never be known and neither will the transition
to the ex-post probabilities. Also we are not aware of empirical methods for testing for the
presence of a preemption game.
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Given the many combinations obtained from the properties of small/large ﬁrms,
eﬃcient/ineﬃcient, good/bad regulation modes, short-run versus dynamic analysis, the
number of cases analysed is still low so far, but theory and evidence of the literature trig-
gered by PL can be reconciled once one does not over-interpret the Porter hypothesis. For
practical policy though, this means that one needs a good knowledge of the properties of
the sectors, a good anticipation of its reaction, and a clear idea how much of a cost increase
one is willing to impose for environmental purposes.
5. Conclusion
Given the prominent role of innovation oﬀsets in the Porter hypothesis, we did prefer
to model it using a framework of technology adoption by Fudenberg and Tirole. In the
stationary version of the model, non-adoption is an equilibrium outcome, although ﬁrms
are proﬁt maximizing.
In our dynamic version of the technology adoption model, early adoption is more costly
than late adoption. By implication, immediate adoption cannot be expected and an equilib-
rium with time periods where a new technology is not adopted by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms
is a rational outcome.
In the national case, under precommitment on the order of adoption, the leader and the
follower adopt earlier if the environmental tax is larger. Under preemption, the timing of
preemptive adoption will be earlier if the environmental tax is higher. Joint late adoption
takes place earlier under a higher environmental tax.
In the international case, the home country raises a tax but the foreign country does
not. Under precommitment on the order of adoption, if home is the follower, it adopts
earlier if the environmental tax is larger, decreasing the time that a foreign ﬁrm can reap the
beneﬁts of early adoption. Comparing behaviour as follower, foreign adopts slower than
home because in the foreign country there is no environmental tax by assumption. If there is
a preemption game, a non-adoption tax in one country ensures that the ﬁrm in that country
can preempt earlier than the ﬁrm in the other country. The home ﬁrm preempts just before
the foreign ﬁrm would do. The chance of preemption jumps from 50/50 to 100% for the
home country if there is an environmental tax. The case of preemption will exist under a
low environmental tax only if the temporary gains of the ﬁrst adoption are high relative to
the temporary losses of the second.
If home wins the preemption game with certainty, due to the environmental tax,
foreign, foreseeing this, limits itself to following. The resulting game then is one of
precommitment.
Under high non-adoption taxes or low temporary gains and losses, there is a precom-
mitment for home to be the leader anyway. Ex-post proﬁts of the home ﬁrm are lower
under precommitment the larger the tax is. In sum, a tax introduces a reduction in ex-post
proﬁts in a precommitment game (anti-Porter), but also turns a preemption game into one
of precommitment, which yields higher proﬁt (pro-Porter).
The empirical evidence of both sector and case studies can be reconciled with our
ﬁndings. The original paper by PL has case studies of international advantage in adoption
settings, but also newer literature from Austria and Germany. In general, case studies under
more imperfect settings and with a clearer adoption type of production process conﬁrm our
theoretical ﬁndings. The review of the case studies reveals that in several cases innovation
oﬀsets can be observed with subsidies. Other evidence is in support of the hypothesis in
sectors with large ﬁrms and strategic activity where ﬁrms have X-ineﬃciency and agency
costs such as managerial time, alertness, and information.
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Notes
1. τ could also be introduced by using country-speciﬁc cost functions; however, our purposes
treating it as a separate ‘cost’ serves our purpose best.
2. The number in brackets is the number of ﬁrms that have adopted: 0, 1, or 2. The subscript 1 (0)
indicates that a ﬁrm has (not) adopted.
3. The cost of adoption, c(t), is deﬁned to be the present value of the cost of adopting the new
technology at time t.
4. The ﬁrst T on the left-hand side denotes the ﬁrm’s own adoption time, the second the other ﬁrm’s
adoption time.
5. Stated diﬀerently, given both technologies without any cost of adoption, the new technology
would always be preferred.
6. See Propositions 2.6 and 2.8.
7. A large π0(1) makes the desire to lead weaker, because it gives a higher weight to the timing
shift eﬀect. But a larger π2(1) has opposing eﬀects directly and from Equation (5).
8. The parameter values presented in the table give the most relevant variations for this simulation
exercise. We have tried other parameter values, which conﬁrm the results we present here.
9. A complication arises here if a customer switches to the foreign competitor after adoption of the
home ﬁrm. It is reasonable to assume that this does not decrease the total beneﬁt of the consumers
of the home ﬁrm.
10. This implies that we do not look again at some papers of the older literature, which have been
made independently of but published during the same years as the PL papers and tackled the
Porter hypothesis only as a side remark. Exceptions are papers, which are held to be relevant
by several other papers selected (from the Journal of Economic Literature and the literature
database ‘econpapers’) in the above-mentioned manner. Ambec and Barla (2005), by virtue of
writing earlier, consider less recent literature, more old literature, emphasize the energy sector
and econometric methods, and by implication ignore case studies.
11. Table 5 summarizes the results of the papers. See also Ambec and Lanoie (2007) for an overview
of related papers.
12. International Association for Energy-Eﬃcient Lighting (IAEEL), IAEEL Newsletter 1 (1999).
13. Energy Star And Other Climate Protection Partnerships, 2005 Annual Report.
14. SenterNovem, Projectenboek CO2-reductieplan, October 2005. Similar forerunner programs
have been discussed by Steger et al. (2004, section 7.3.1).
15. Many other examples can be found in PL (1995a, 1995b, in particular on page 123) and in IAEEL
(1999).
16. Capital composition is discussed in Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) and in Feichtinger et al.
(2005). Note in particular that additional R&D and patenting through regulation are additional
costs as suggested by the neoclassical static ﬁrst principles, which still need to be trans-
formed into proﬁts, productivity, etc. Therefore, they should not be interpreted as support for
the Porter hypothesis unless they lead to higher proﬁts as in some of the two-stage Cournot
models.
17. Interpretation of his calculations of revealed comparative advantage indices gives no clear results
because they suﬀer from the EU accession in 1995 with its trade diversion and creation eﬀects and
the recession in 1998 in connection with the Austrian budget deﬁcit reductions. For a discussion
of early papers using cost function estimates and the associated problems, see Smith and Walsh
(2000).
18. To the extent that these ineﬃciencies reﬂect diﬀerent technologies, the question is why technolo-
gies are diﬀerent. Are there reasons for diﬀerences in timing of adoption with the limiting case
of never adopting?
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